After the election of the George W. Bush and his administration’s earlier attempts to reduce anti-American sentiment in the Arab world by criticizing Israeli policies in occupied territories, the Israel lobby and its supporters in the domestic political environment thought that the Bush administration would follow the earlier Bush administration headed by George Bush Sr. and challenge the pro-Israeli power circles within the US politics. However, the later phases of the given US administration proved that the younger Bush has been influenced more by the Israel lobby than by the oil lobby.[1]  Chairman of the Bush administration’s quasi-official Defense Policy Board, Richard Perle, co-authored an article advising Israel to make a clean break from the peace process and he also wrote in the National Interest that Israel should re-occupy the territories under Palestinian Authority control.[2] 

Certainly, this is only a small clue for the fact that the Bush administration includes numerous political figures whose political way of thinking and political undertakings are in favor of the state of Israel together with their ability to bring significant levels of influence over domestic and foreign policy of the administration. The existence of the important political figures close to the Israel lobby and loyal to the state of Israel was not the only justification for the rapid development of the relationship between the Bush administration and the state of Israel after the initial periods of the Bush administration. Rising popularity of the “Israel first” approach regarding the policies of the given administration can also be illustrated by the neo-conservative movement’s close affinity with the Christian right in post-September 11 era concerning their perspectives on the Middle East policies of the Bush administration, and one of the important examples of the growing empathy between neo-conservatives and Christian right can be revealed as the interesting alliance formed to increase or at least maintain the support of Bush administration to Israel. William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, and Gary Bauer, formerly head of the Christian Coalition, brought their resources together to constitute a political force in supporting Israel oriented policies on Capitol Hill.[3]

Needless to say that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 played a crucially important role within the process of escalating appeal of the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s and the Israel lobby’s political standpoints regarding the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East region. Terrorist attacks, in fact, perfectly exploited by the Israel lobby in the United States in order to locate the United States’ relationship with Israel in the middle of the neo-conservatives’ political and strategic calculations regarding the war on terrorism in which Israel seen as an ally in the war on terror, where Iran, Iraq and Syria are classified as rough states and the given reasoning spread to the public opinion by the contributions of the Israel lobby.

Furthermore, the employment of the terrorist attacks as a pretext by the Israeli lobby for retrieving more support from the United States to the state of Israel can be considered as a continuation of the traditional ‘interest creation’ tactic of the lobby. An earlier important example of the ‘interest creation’ tactic was the lobby’s set of efficient undertakings to retrieve military aid for Israel when it had to agree the United States’ profitable arms sales policies concerning the Saudi Arabia and some other moderate Arab allies of the United States. It can be interpreted that the given tactic of the Israel lobby sometimes creates direct threats for the United States’ exclusive national interests in the Middle East, and this study is not the only one supporter of the given idea. In order to substantiate this suggestion, it is going to be quite convincing to use a citation from the report of one of the governmental agencies of the Bush administration as an example. According to the State Department’s Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and the Muslim World, citizens in these countries are genuinely worried and upset regarding the difficulties and dilemmas of the Palestinians originating from the conflict, and they perceive that the United States is playing instead of mediating.[4]  The given example explains the tension occurred within the Arab countries as a result of the exploitation of significant international phenomena, such as terrorism, by the Israel lobby in order to justify its goals and tactics used to influence the policy decisions of the US.

As an addition to the citation above, it is quite logical to look at the views of American public, regarding their country’s attitude toward Israel, reported by a May 2003 poll. According to the poll, 60 percent of Americans were willing to withhold aid to Israel if it resisted U.S. policies to settle the conflict, and the percentage rose to 70 percent among ‘politically active’ Americans.[5]  The reason behind last two citations was to explain how the lobby effectively waits for an opportunity to be used in order to increase its presence within the policy procedures even if there are both internal and external criticisms or disapproval regarding the lobby influenced and Israel-oriented foreign policy preferences of the United States. Hence, During the Bush administration, terrorism has obviously used by the Israeli lobby as a pretext to advance its political agenda. As a result of the lobby’s efficient exploitation of the terrorist attacks, the Bush administrations’ totally pro-Israeli staff or appointment portfolio, and the administration’s lack of insistence in its criticism on the aggressive Israeli policies in the occupied territories, Washington ended up backing Israel’s foreign policy approach instead of curbing it during the Bush administration. In 2001, there was a clear example of ‘interest creation’ activity of the Israel lobby by the use of terrorism when President Bush approached Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to allow Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres to have a meeting with Yasser Arafat. Sharon accused Bush of trying to appease the Arabs at Israel’s expense.[6]  In order to weaken Bush’s political maneuver and justify his position, Ariel Sharon immediately joined his forces with the Israel lobby in the United States to convince the American people that the Israel and United States of America were facing with a common terrorist threat and there was no difference between Arafat and Osama Bin Laden.[7]  This was simply a play on the terrorist attacks happened in United States by the lobby and Arial Sharon in order to isolate Yasser Arafat.

As the lobby is operating in more than one political ground, it was not only assisting Ariel Sharon to sway the Bush administration’s policy. Furthermore, an AIPAC-led letter has prepared by eighty-nine senators and sent to President Bush on November 2001, which was inviting him to reject any meeting with Arafat, but also requesting that the United States should not prevent Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians.[8]  This is a classical example regarding the Israel lobby’s ability to synchronize with the leadership in Israel in order to reach the expected results by the use of its cards in the Congress and the Presidency of the United States.
Obviously, there were political figures within the Bush administration who faced with much advanced pressure by the lobby than the President. Possibly, the most important example is Colin Powell who had a more evenhanded approach than many other political figures within the Bush administration. After Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited the region and he brought considerable pressure on all sides, including Israel, to start negotiating. However, he began to receive quite negative responses from pro-Israel officials in Vice President Cheney’s office, and he also criticized by figures close to the lobby, such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan, on the basis of his inability to distinguish terrorists from fighting terrorists.[9]  In addition, the lobby mobilized its forces in the Congress and the Presidency in order to handle the situation in a way that would increase the support available for Israel. As a response to President Bush’s demand from Sharon to cease the attacks and initiate withdrawal, Tom DeLay and former Senate minority leader Trent Lott visited the White House to request a re-evaluation of George Bush’s standpoint concerning the topic.[10]

The Congress, which is one of the strongholds of the Israeli lobby, ignored the Bush administration’s concerns, and passed two resolutions confirming the support for Israel and portraying the state of Israel as if it was engaging in a common struggle with the United States against terrorism.[11]  Such approvals of the Congress concerning the Israel’s political attitudes and resistance towards the Middle East perceptions and views of the Bush administration explains how the lobby worked efficiently to suppress the views of Colin Powell and drag President Bush towards the lobby’s side. For instance, the Congress issued a $200 million loan, backed by the lobby, to Israel to fight terrorism through a House appropriations subcommittee, and the given loan was highly opposed by Secretary of State, Colin Powell.[12]  However, the most tragic part of the story was not the financial aid. It was quite ironic that a congressional delegation visiting Israel from the Congress of the United States has advised and advocated Ariel Sharon’s resistance to the United States’ pressures on him regarding the conclusion of Operation Defensive Shield and negotiating with Yasser Arafat.[13]

As the Israel lobby won the previously mentioned early victories in the United States during the Bush administration regarding the construction of a level of support in Presidency and the Congress for Israel’s resistance to United States’ pressures concerning the negotiations with Palestinians and Israeli policies in occupied territories, the perception of the Bush administration was modified regarding the state of Israel, peace process, and the US policies in the Middle East. Officials within the administration have perceived that any political maneuver of the President and his evenhanded Secretary of State to distance the United States from Israel, such as their approaches on the Operation Defensive Shield of the IDF, would raise a powerful and effective campaign by the lobby and its supporters in the Congress. Also, the coming elections were increasing the pressure over the Bush administration, as they were dealing with John Kerry who displayed his resolute support for Israel.[14]  It can be interpreted that the lobby’s immediate pressure on the Secretary of State regarding his criticism of the Israel’s tactics against the Palestinians, persuasion of President Bush not to deal with Arafat by Ariel Sharon and the Israel lobby, and the strong pro-Israel resolutions of the Congress have arranged and constructed the basis for the continuing expansion of the “Israel first” foreign policy approach of the Bush doctrine. In other words, the initial and relatively small clashes between the Bush administration and Israeli side including Ariel Sharon and the lobby led to a change in the subsequent perceptions of the Bush administration regarding the Middle East and the state of Israel because the specified tensions, which analyzed above, ended with decisive victories of the lobby, such as Ariel Sharon’s continued hard line approach against Palestinians even if it was criticized by the President, and the approval of the $200 million aid even if it was highly opposed by the Secretary of State.

Previous discussions are explaining the lobby’s ability to draw support for Israel from the United States even if the President and the Secretary of State are not supporting some important sections of the state of Israel’s policies. This ability is totally associated with the one of the core goals of the Israel lobby, which is to maintain the United States’ support for Israel’s policies against the Palestinians. During the Bush administration period, the government headed by Ariel Sharon in Israel and the lobby in the US have perfectly used and exploited the terrorist attacks to justify Israel’s policies against Palestinians and receive military or other related sorts of aid from the United States in order to maintain Israel’s dominant regional power.

After the terrorist attacks, the foreign policy perceptions of the Bush administration have crucially changed. Their standpoints regarding the Middle East and the state of Israel was already changing in a pro-Israel nature by the lobby’s efficient undertakings, mentioned above, in the early periods of the administration. However, occurrences took place with the attacks have nourished the neoconservative fraction within the Bush administration, and such a political environment directly turned the United States foreign policy into a responsive policy. For instance, the Bush doctrine included the concept of preemption that made an inventory of the United States possible enemies and asked for a preventive military measure before the possible enemies takes any action against the United States. While the Bush Doctrine gained support from the neoconservative political fraction in the United States, the Israel lobby took a close stance towards the neoconservatives because the Middle Eastern countries mentioned by the Bush doctrine and listed in several speeches of the President also constituted threats to the state of Israel’s security according to the lobby. As the chapter previously mentioned the ‘interest creation’ tactic of the lobby, it was quite logical for the lobby to credit the neoconservatives and the Bush doctrine in order to encourage any political or military measure of the administration against the countries mentioned in the Bush doctrine because the same countries are possible troublemakers for Israel. In other words, the lobby’s tactic was to draw interests for the state of Israel by supporting the neoconservative movement, which will provide the opportunity to the state of Israel to deter some of its adversaries in the region without firing a bullet. In order to provide a relevant example of the lobby’s close stance with respect the neoconservatives, it is quite interesting to evaluate two letters sent to Bill Clinton before Bush became president. In 1998, neoconservative political figures, many of whom had close relations with Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and Washington Institute of Near East Policy, have published two open letters to President Clinton asking him to topple Saddam Hussein, and some of the signatories were quite passionate supporters of Israel, such as Elliot Abrams, Richard Perle, William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, Donald Rumsfeld and Bernard Lewis.[15]  The tendency of the Israeli lobby to support the neoconservative agenda within the United States’ foreign policy formulation can also be associated with its close ties to the neo-conservative elements in the Bush administration such as Eric Edelman and Scooter Libby. Moreover, the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA) presented Paul Wolfowitz its Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award as a result of his close stance to pro-Israel think tanks, and also as a result of Paul Wolfowitz’s efforts to persuade the President to attack Iraq before Afghanistan in their critic meeting on the 15 September 2002. [16]

Actually, the lobby’s effects or influences on the war on terrorism can be classified as indirect because the lobby’s support for the neoconservatives and the interests of the state of Israel received from the war on terrorism are results of the lobby’s appealing character existing for decades. In other words, neoconservatives did not immediately start to cooperate with the lobby. They were already too close to the lobby as a result of the special meaning of the state of Israel for them, which is quite deep and special for the majority of the politically active Americans, and the lobby is the biggest factor that explained or even created this meaning for the American public. So, the given role of the lobby improved its appealing character for specially right wing politicians was quite important for decades, and it is not something that arose after the terrorist attacks. In other words, the Israel lobby achieved to transform itself to a part of the politics in the United States. If a lobby transforms itself to a regular part of a country’s political system, its meaning to the politically active figures would automatically pull it into the decision making process on crucially important matter, such as war on terrorism. For instance, if it is needed to discuss Princeton Historian Bernard Lewis’s efforts to convince Vice-President Dick Cheney to support the war, it should be admitted that the lobby’s ‘interest creation’ tactic during important developments is deriving from its success to pull such political figures to its side from the beginning of its existence and operation within the United States political system.

Example provided above explains how the neoconservatives in the lobby were there before all these developments, and how their existence in the lobby turned to be a benefit for Israel and the lobby after terrorist attacks took place. For instance, Eric Edelman and Scooter Libby played key roles to persuade Vice-President Cheney to support the invasion of Iraq, who were already associated with the Israel lobby.[17]  Such political maneuvers transformed a sort of campaign of some power spheres within the United States’ foreign policy machinery in order to win support for invading Iraq, and the lobby’s view on the given campaign was positive as itself and the state of Israel were in the list of beneficiaries. For instance, the task of the Policy Counter-terrorism Evaluation Group was to find or uncover links between al-Qaeda and the state of Iraq, and the given group’s key member was Richard Perle who has a pro-Israeli hard line approach regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel’s policies in the region. In addition, the specified group that was tasked to find the links between Iraq and al-Qaeda was reporting its findings to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith who have long-standing ties to the Likud Party and a close relationship with the Israel lobby.[18]  Within the domestic political and diplomatic processes prior to the invasion of Iraq, the key political figures and actors’ devotion to Israel, their approach concerning Iraq, and their strong posts in the Bush administration automatically introduced the lobby into the list of factors that led the United States’ to invade Iraq, but obviously the rank that the lobby has in the list of factors that led to the invasion of Iraq was quite lower than the rank of neoconservatives with close ties to the lobby.

During the Clinton administration, United States of America was employing a ‘dual containment’ foreign policy strategy, which required stationing of United States’ forces in the region to contain Iran and Iraq, and it was designed by Martin Indyk at Washington Institute of Near East Policy and than Indyk implemented this policy when he was Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council[19]  However, the given strategy made the United States an enemy of Iran and Iraq, which are enemies of themselves at the same time. So, it was not appealing anymore during the late period of the Clinton administration but the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) worked hard in the Congress to save dual containment since it was obviously an appealing strategy of the United States for Israel and the Israel lobby[20]  With the Bush administration’s possession of the executive branch, the neoconservatives in the administration argued that the dual containment was not enough and a regime change in Iraq was essential, instead of arguing like the Clinton administration about what the given strategy was brining to the United States. The given perception of the neoconservatives which was favoring the expansion of the dual containment strategy by the help of a regime change in Iraq, is described as an invention of Natan Sharansky who is an Israeli politician whose writings have impressed President Bush.[21]   It can be understood from the following explanation that there was a politically natural overlap among the perceptions of the neoconservatives and the Israel lobby regarding the United States policies in the Middle East. In other words, the lobby’s correspondence with the neoconservatives on the crucial matters located it as one of the power sources of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration. A power source that is not exploited by the neoconservatives but voluntarily supplied its rewards.

After the invasion of Iraq, the lobby’s level of involvement in the war on terrorism has increased. In an short time period after the initiation of the commitment in Iraq, Washington Institute of Near East Policy (WINEP), with the support from prominent figures in the Sharon government in Israel such as Ephraim Halevy, released an influential report Stating that Syria should not miss the message that countries with irresponsible and defiant behavior could end up sharing Saddam regime’s fate.[22]

Certainly, it is needless to say that the lobby’s increasing presence in the war on terrorism after the invasion of Iraq was not only related to the Presidency and the neoconservative lines of reasoning among the White House staff and appointments. The Congress was also a platform for the rising presence of the lobby within the political circles demanding a tougher stance against Syria. Congressman Eliot Engel brought the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act into the discussion within the Congress, and the given act was strongly supported by the AIPAC while it was calling Syria and Lebanon to take serious steps to make peace with Israel.[23]  Actually, it can be interpreted that the Congress’s insistence and the Bush administration’s hesitation to target Syria is an explanation of how the Israeli lobby is always more powerful in its bastion, which is the Congress. Also, the Bush administration’s ability or obligation to control the scope of the war on terrorism by choosing not to attack Syria after the intervention in Iraq is quite relevant considering a decisive level of problems faced in Iraq. It can be interpreted that the given choice of the Bush administration not to enlarge the scope of the war on terrorism, in spite of the neoconservatives and the lobby’s undertakings in the opposite way, is representing a nice record in the Bush administration’s transcript where worldwide criticisms are obviously in majority.

Iran is also on the top of the list in the lobby’s agenda of the foreign policy matters in which possible advantages are available for Israel. Iran was the main topic at hand in the last annual American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference in Washington where the lobby’s influence regarding United States’ attitude towards Iraq was hidden in the words of Gary Ackerman, Chairman of House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Gary Ackerman told AIPAC lobbyists what they were really wondering to hear; “There is neither time, nor need to continue to wonder about the efficacy of sanctions, they work. We know they work and we know we need more of them.”[24]  Also, the given conference included a passionate speech by Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni in which Livni underlined the American-Israeli strategic alliance, and she called the international community to deny Iran a place in the international arena because of its political attitudes. George W. Bush responded to the lobby’s wide-ranging pressure by paying attention and focusing the international attention on Iran’s nuclear program.

In its general relationship with the Israel lobby, the Bush administration advanced the links that the lobby had with the White House during the Clinton administration. Especially, the neoconservative sections within the administration and their high level of understanding of Israeli lobby, prior to their possession of political posts, have increased the opportunities available for the lobby in order to retrieve some advantages for the state of Israel and itself.

The level of the lobby’s influence on the Bush administration can be perceived by citing an interesting conversation between Douglas Feith, who was substituting Rumsfeld at an interagency meeting, and Condoleezza Rice. After Douglas Feith’s conclusion of his remarks on the Middle East on behalf of the Pentagon, Condoleezza Rice, who was National Security Advisor of the time, said; “Thanks Doug, but when we want the Israeli position we will invite the ambassador.” [25]

[1]   Michael Lind, “Distorting U.S. Foreign Policy: The Israel Lobby and American Power”, Third  World Traveler (Washington Report – On Middle East Affairs), May 2002, p. 3.
[2]   Ibid., p. 4.
[3]   Don Wagner, “For Zion’s Sake”, Middle East Report, No. 223 (Summer, 2002), p. 57.
[4]   Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: Anew Strategic Direction for U.S Public Diplomacy in the Arab and
Muslim World, Submitted to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives. October 1, 2003.
[5]   Steven Kull, “Americans on the Middle East Road Map”, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, May 30, 2003, pp. 9-11, 18-19.
[6]   John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby”, London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 23 (March 2006), p. 13.
[7]    Serge Schmemann, “Raising Muich, Sharon Reveals Israeli Qualms”, New York Times, October 6, 2001.
[8]    Elaine Sciolino, “Senators Urge Bush Not to Hamper Israel”, New York Times, November 17, 2001.
[9]    Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002. p. 323-326. Also see; William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Senior White House Aides: Speak Up!”, Weekly
Standard, April 11, 2002.
[10]  John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby”, London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No.23 (March 2006), p. 13.
[11]  Alison Mitchell, “House and Senate Support Israel in Strong Resolutions”, New York Times,  May 3, 2002.
[12]  Eli Lake, “Israel Lobby Wins $200 Million Fight.”, United Press International, May 11, 2002.
[13]  Arieh O’Sullivan, “Visiting Congressmen Advise Israel to Resist Administration Pressure to Deal with Arafat”, Jarusalem Post, May 6, 2002.
[14]  John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby”, London Review of Books, Vol. 28,  No. 23 (March 2006), p. 13.
[15]  Zalmay Khalizad and Paul Wolfowitz, “Overthrow Him”, Weekly Standard, December 1, 1997,  p. 14-15.
[16]  James Fallows “The Unilateralist”, Atlantic Monthly, March 2002, pp. 26-29.
[17]  Nicolas Lehmann, “The Iraq Factor”, New Yorker, Vol. 76, Issue. 43, pp. 34-48.
[18]  Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence Policy, and the War in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March-April 2006), pp. 15-27.
[19]  Lake, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 45-53.
[20]  Z. Brzezinski and B. Scowcroft, Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, Report  of an Independent Study Group on Gulf Stability and Security, Council on ForeignRelations,  New York, 1997, p. 6.
[21]  John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby”, London Review of Books, Vol. 28,  No. 23 (March 2006), p. 18.
[22]  Seymour M. Hersh, “The Syrian Bet”, New Yorker, Vol. 79, Issue 20 (July 28, 2003), pp. 32-36.
[23]  Claude Salhani, “The Syria Accountability Act: Taking the Wrong Way to Damascus”, Policy Analysis, No. 512, CATO Institute, March 18, 2004, pp. 1-5.
[24]  www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=836216 accessed on 12/03/07 
[25]  Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith Knew and When He Knew It”, New Yorker, Vol. 81, Issue 12 (May 9, 2005), pp. 36-41. Also, see Jim Lobe, “Losing Feith, or is the Bush Team Shedding Its Sharper Edges?” The Daily Star, January 31, 2005.

Mehmet Talaykurt

Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi

Doktora Öğrencisi

Bu e-posta adresi spam korumalıdır. Lütfen JavaScriptleri etkinleştirin.